

While some crew members argued that they had been maligned by reports of the drug use, others expressed relief that the drug-abuse issue had been uncovered. According to these sources, crew members regularly used amphetamines to sustain themselves during 18-hour workdays. This form of drug abuse was not recreational nor casual, but rather habitual. The DOD survey shows a 28-percent use of amphetamines by Navy personnel. When contrasted to the civilian population, military use of amphetamines is twice as high."

Mr. President, I request permission to insert into the RECORD at this point two articles on the subject of drug abuse in the military.

The articles follow:

[From the Washington Post, May 13, 1983]
NINE IN ARMY SELECT UNIT FAIL MARIHUANA TEST

(By Mike Sager)

Nine members of the Army's select White House Guard Company have been placed on company restriction and are being reassigned after unannounced urinalysis tests revealed traces of marihuana.

The test was administered to the 50 members of 1st Platoon, E Company, 3rd Infantry. The Army White House Guard, an elite corps of 200 enlisted men who perform ceremonial duties, is attached to the Old Guard at Fort Myer, the oldest active infantry unit in the Army. The results of the March 19 tests were received the first of this week, according to Col. Jamie Walton of the public information office of the Military District of Washington.

The offending soldiers, Walton said, are now awaiting reassignment from the 3rd Infantry to other Army units. Disciplinary action in the form of nonjudicial punishment—extra duty, suspension of pay, or reduction in grade—is also pending.

Two of the soldiers, contacted yesterday, declined to be quoted by name. One, a 23-year-old private, said "I don't smoke marihuana. I'm around some people who do, but I don't smoke it myself."

"One morning they told us we were going to take a test. They handed out specimen bottles. I have no idea why they did it," the private said. The nine soldiers, he said, asked to be retested but were refused.

Attempts to reach the soldiers' commanding officer were unsuccessful.

The White House declined comment on the incident through a press spokesman yesterday.

Random urine tests for marihuana use have been administered in the armed forces, at the discretion of individual commanding officers, since the beginning of last year. However, in an effort to crack down even more heavily on drug use, the Army will begin on July 1 processing for discharge all officers, noncommissioned officers and senior enlisted soldiers found to be drug users, and all enlisted soldiers determined to be second-time drug abusers.

"Things are going to get very, very tough. The Army is putting out notice that drug use will not be tolerated," said Margaret Tackley of the Army public affairs office.

Since February 1982, when the Department of Defense began giving the urine tests to U.S. soldiers on a worldwide basis, Army spokesman Walton said, about 10 percent of those in the White House Guard tested showed signs of marihuana use and were immediately reassigned. Walton could not say how many soldiers that represented, except that it was "a small number."

A survey of drug use in the armed forces, to be released soon, shows that 22 percent of enlisted men and women use marihuana at least once a month, down from 37 percent in 1980, the Defense Department said.

"There has been a substantial decrease of drug abuse in the armed forces, and we are ascribing that to the increased use of urinalysis," said John Allen, with the department's office of health promotion.

The urine tests for marihuana, introduced commercially in 1980, are considered accurate up to 14 days after use of the drug, according to researchers at Sylva Co. of Palo Alto, Calif., the company that pioneered the commercial tests. Current technology, however, can measure neither the quantity used nor whether the user was actually high on the drug.

In addition, conflicting claims about accuracy have arisen. The National Institute on Drug Abuse claims a 95 percent or higher accuracy, and the military says its methods are virtually foolproof. But critics, like the National Organization for the Reform of Marihuana Laws, claim the tests are only 50 percent accurate and that they can also wrongly accuse someone who "passively inhaled" marihuana fumes.

Human error can be a factor as well. In 1982, for instance, the D.C. police tested recruits and found that 39 had recently used marihuana. After the recruits alleged that the bottles containing the urine samples were mislabeled, misplaced and possibly switched, 24 of the recruits were reinstated.

[From the New York Times, Nov. 22, 1982]

SEARCHING OF NAVY MAIL FOR NARCOTICS STARTING

NORFOLK, VA., Nov. 21 (UPI).—The Navy began its new policy of searching military mail Saturday, and officials said it would help stem the flow of illegal drugs and contraband to troops stationed overseas.

The policy, which allows searches and seizures of mail deemed suspicious by officials of the Military Postal Service, has been criticized by sailors, who say it is an invasion of privacy.

Previously only United States Postal Service workers were allowed to inspect mail. Only mail addressed to service members overseas and sent through the Military Postal Service is subject to the new policy.

A Defense Department spokesman said Friday that an agreement, worked out between the Pentagon and the Postal Service, was adopted as a policy last month and that it extends to all branches of the military. This authority has been sought for two years as a way of keeping narcotics from reaching troops overseas.

Ship commanders and officers overseas were given immediate authority to begin inspecting and searching.

Random inspections of mailbags and parcels will be allowed, through use of metal detectors, drug-sniffing dogs, and fluoroscopes. But officials will be required to obtain a search warrant to open a letter if there is reasonable suspicion that contraband exists.

A complete statement of the parcel's opening must also be forwarded to the service's senior military postal official, Navy officials said.

REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, reports from Central America indicate there a serious regional crisis of people—of humanitarian and refugee problems spilling across and within

the borders of all the countries in the area. Nearly a million people are refugees and the numbers are still growing.

The refugee crisis in El Salvador is even worse than it was in Vietnam. At the peak of our involvement in Indochina, 8 percent of the civilians were displaced persons or refugees, whereas the number in El Salvador is now over 10 percent. And thousands upon thousands of these refugees are condemned to exist in camps with subhuman conditions as deplorable as those in Vietnam.

That the humanitarian needs of refugees have been neglected far too long in El Salvador is clearly documented in a staff report submitted to the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy. There is now an urgent need for additional food and medical assistance to deal with camps which have been allowed to fester for over a year.

The administration has talked a great deal about the need for more military aid, but we have heard little about the escalating humanitarian crisis. It makes no sense to pour millions of dollars of military assistance to El Salvador if it cannot provide basic assistance and protection to its citizens displaced by the violence and conflict for which military aid is sought.

Mr. President, I hope the administration will now finally give the humanitarian and human rights problems in Central America, but particularly in El Salvador, the priority they deserve. If they are not addressed more adequately, they will not only complicate, but perhaps undermine, efforts to achieve peace and stability in the region.

I commend to the attention of Congress the subcommittee's staff report, which was jointly filed this week by the chief counsel and minority counsel, and I ask that the summary of their findings and recommendations be printed at this point in the RECORD.

The summary follows:

REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

(Staff Report prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, D.C., September 21, 1983.

To: Senator Alan K. Simpson, Chairman, and Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

From: Richard W. Day, Chief Counsel, Jerry M. Tinker, Minority Counsel.

At your request, we undertook a study mission to Central America to review the refugee and related humanitarian problems in the region. Between August 30 and September 10, 1983, we traveled to El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala to assess the separate, but interwoven, refugee issues, including the problems of displaced persons, questions of international humanitarian assistance, and conditions in the field. Of particular interest in El Salvador was a review of

conditions that might bear on the question of whether the United States should adopt a policy of granting extended voluntary departure to Salvadorans who are not in lawful immigration status in the United States.

In El Salvador we met with the senior American officers at the U.S. Embassy and the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) mission, U.S. military advisors in the field, and American voluntary agency personnel. We had extensive discussions with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United Nations World Food Program, the United Nations Development Program as well as with officers at many levels of the Salvadoran government, including the Minister of Interior, the Director of Immigration, and officials of the National Commission for Displaced Persons. In addition, we met with Monsignor Ricardo Urioste, Assistant to the Archbishop of El Salvador, Maria Julia Hernandez of the Archdiocese human rights monitoring organization, Tutela Legal, and Benjamin Cestoni, Executive Secretary of the newly established Human Rights Commission in El Salvador. Field visits were made to San Vicente and Morazan provinces and to displaced persons camps in and around San Salvador.

In Honduras, meetings were similarly held with U.S. Embassy officials, including Ambassador John Negroponte, with senior members of the Honduran government and military, officials of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and with the staff of the voluntary agencies and church organizations working in Honduras. Field visits were conducted to the Salvadoran refugee camp in the northwest at Mesa Grande, to the south in Danli where Nicaraguan Ladino refugees have fled, and to the Miskito Indian refugees in Mocoran near the east coast.

A brief stop was made in Guatemala City where meetings were arranged with U.S. Embassy officials, including Ambassador Frederic Chapin, senior members of the Guatemalan government and military, and with voluntary agency personnel working in the field.

The following preliminary report represents our joint findings and recommendations.

TABLE I.—SUMMARY OF REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

[September 1983]

Location	Refugees	Displaced persons
El Salvador:		
Government registered		264,000
ICRC (contested areas)		80,000
Church protection		124,000
Subtotal		468,000
Honduras:		
Salvadorans	19,000	
Guatemalans	1,000	
Nicaraguans (Ladinos)	2,500	
Nicaraguans (Miskito)	15,200	
Subtotal	37,700	
Guatemala: Estimated displaced ¹ 10,000 to 450,000		100,000
Nicaragua: Salvadorans	17,500	
Costa Rica (mixture)	36,000	
Mexico:		
Guatemalans	45,000	
Salvadorans ²	50,000	
Subtotal	95,000	
Total	186,000	568,000
Regional total		754,200

¹ No firm statistics exist on displaced persons in Guatemala, but it is clearly a significant problem.

² Statistics on Salvadorans in Mexico are guestimates.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Central America today confronts a human dilemma. Throughout the region there is a tide of people on the move—with over three quarters of a million men, women and children either displaced from their lands and homes, or fleeing across borders from the violence, conflict, and economic adversity in their homeland. In El Salvador alone, well over 10 percent of its population are displaced or have fled.¹

The numerous humanitarian issues confronting the region—refugee and displaced persons, political violence, hunger and medical problems—must be dealt with more adequately or they will not only complicate, but perhaps undermine, efforts to achieve peace and stability in the region.

Among the humanitarian issues needing attention are the following:

1. *Strengthening international protection and assistance to refugees and displaced persons.*—If the needs of refugees and displaced persons throughout the region are to be adequately met, there must be an effort to bolster and expand the work of the several international and voluntary agencies already involved in the area, and to encourage others to join in the effort. Of particular importance is the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In Honduras, the UNHCR is performing an outstanding role as coordinator for international assistance to refugees, and fulfilling its mandate to provide refugee protection. However, in El Salvador no such international umbrella exists for an even more serious displaced person problem. It is urgently needed.

The United States should lend strong diplomatic support to the creation of an international coordinating agency in El Salvador to stimulate and channel additional assistance to an estimated half million internal refugees who are in need of help. As outlined in this report, there are currently three different agencies and channels for providing assistance to displaced persons in El Salvador, and too little coordination or mutual support exists between them. Both to coordinate humanitarian assistance, as well as to assure that needs are equally met among the various groups now being assisted—and to depoliticize the use of such aid—the U.S. should support efforts to designate either the ICRC, the U.N. World Food Program (WFP) or, the good offices of the UNHCR, as the international coordinating agency for humanitarian assistance in El Salvador.

The ICRC already has a substantial presence and record of accomplishment in El Salvador and could easily expand its operation and staff to provide needed coordination, if the government of El Salvador requests it and if the United States is willing to support its expansion. Similarly, the WFP is moving to establish a more permanent program to meet what clearly will be on-going food needs among displaced persons. Since the provision of food—and the food-for-work programs for the displaced—is by far the largest component of the relief program, WFP, is empowered to assume a coordinating role if asked.

¹ By comparison, and as a gauge of population displacement, during the worst days of the Vietnam War the number of internal refugees never exceeded 8 percent of the population. In Afghanistan, it is nearly 16 percent of the population, most living as refugees in Pakistan.

However, the role of international coordinator would even more appropriately and effectively be played by the UNHCR—which already has a substantial presence in the region and whose work with Salvadorans in Honduras and elsewhere is directly tied to the developments inside El Salvador. The U.S. should explore with the Salvadoran government the possibility of asking UNHCR to exercise its "good offices" function to assume the role of international coordinator of humanitarian assistance for displaced persons in El Salvador. There is ample precedence of such action and, given conditions today in El Salvador, justification to move forward on it.

2. *Increased humanitarian assistance to El Salvador.*—For nearly a year, the growing number of displaced persons in El Salvador was not addressed by the United States or the government of El Salvador. The first effort to assess their numbers and needs was not launched until January, 1982, when there were already between 165,000 and 200,000 displaced persons throughout the country. Most of them had moved in with friends or family members or were living in shantytowns around urban centers. About 5 percent of the displaced persons were considered at the time to be living in "extremely deplorable conditions." Over the following year, but particularly since the beginning of 1983, the number of displaced persons in such conditions has increased as the problem in many locations increased into large-scale refugee camp situations.

A formal government program of assistance was established, but needs persist. During the past year, the United States provided a small employment generating, food-for-work type of project, and an immunization program. However, by mid-1983 it became apparent that such efforts were inadequate to meet growing relief needs—inadequate to deal with camp-like conditions (which are still sub-standard in some areas)—or to respond to shortages of food and medicines.

In the days ahead, El Salvador can expect:

A large population of displaced persons will remain in need of help as the conflict in the countryside continues and as the economy continues to flounder.

Tens of thousands of displaced persons, mostly women and children, will remain dependent upon regular distributions of food and medicines, some in short supply and both subject to maldistribution.

Pockets of serious malnutrition and disease will persist among civilians in rural areas and contested zones cut-off by the fighting.

Human rights violations will persist in many areas of the country as the violence from the left and the right continues.

The nation's economy, and its support of the health, education and welfare programs (such as they exist) will continue to decline.

In short, the humanitarian problems confronting the people of El Salvador will remain. The United States should consider doubling its 1984 contributions to direct relief programs in El Salvador from the modest \$10.5 million spent this year. A.I.D. should be authorized to use additional Economic Support Funds (ESF) and other appropriate program funds to support public health projects and employment generation programs for displaced persons.

There must be a commitment to improving the conditions of the displaced persons as part of the overall strategy for economic recovery in El Salvador. While some military assistance is obviously necessary, a complementary program of humanitarian aid is also needed to help El Salvador provide basic assistance and protection to its

citizens displaced by the conflict and violence.

3. Continued support for refugees in Honduras.—After a difficult beginning, the UNHCR has established an effective program to assist and protect a growing number of Salvadoran, Guatemalan and Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras. Although some problems remain in assuring protection for Salvadoran refugees, the dark days of the La Virtud situation are behind us and an effective working relationship has been established between officers of the UNHCR and the Honduran civilian and military authorities.

Camp conditions in Mesa Grande, where some 10,000 Salvadorans are settled, are good by international standards. Although there is not enough land to allow them to become self-sufficient, even if the Honduran government permitted them to farm it (which they do not, except under strict controls), the camp is nonetheless relatively spacious, the programs of support adequate, and education, handicraft and other programs being undertaken by the voluntary agencies are imaginative. In fact, in the near term, proposals to close or transfer substantial portions of this camp should be discouraged. The refugees do not want to move at this time, and such a move—even with self-sufficiency as its goal—would be a questionable use of scarce international resources, given the good conditions achieved at Mesa Grande at some considerable cost and effort. This is particularly the case if the companion Salvadoran camp at Colomoncagua is moved from the border for security reasons, or if the refugee flow from Nicaragua increases.

In general, refugee conditions in Honduras are stable, and the attitude of the government in accepting its status as a country of first asylum should be commended. Even if the numbers of new arrivals were to increase in the future, an excellent infrastructure of personnel and programs has been established under UNHCR auspices and it should be able to handle such an influx easily.

The longer-term problem of reaching a durable solution for the refugees in Honduras, especially for the Salvadorans who cannot stay forever, remains problematic. In the meantime, however, the program of assistance and protection is more than satisfactory and it deserves the strong support of the United States.

4. Extended Voluntary Departure for Salvadorans in the United States.—It is estimated today that there are up to 500,000 Salvadorans in the United States in illegal immigration status. Some United States groups have called for extended voluntary departure status for these people until the conflict in El Salvador subsides. However, this status has not been granted, the rationale being that there is no evidence of persecution of those who are sent back, that there are other countries of first asylum available, and that most Salvadorans here in the United States are economic migrants without valid claims to persecution in El Salvador.

Extensive efforts have been made by many private and religious groups to determine the fate of Salvadorans returning from the United States, and no evidence has been found to document that they are harmed.

There are areas of the country, particularly in the city of San Salvador and in the western provinces, where the conflict and violence is minimal. There are displaced person camps throughout the country where food and medical assistance is available and international personnel are present. And the Honduran government has indicated

its willingness to accept all refugees who enter Honduras from El Salvador.

The 300 to 350 Salvadorans who are currently being returned by the United States to El Salvador each month² are subject to the same violence every resident of that country faces, but there is clear evidence that there is no governmentally sanctioned program to target or harass returning Salvadorans simply because they have been in the United States.

However, no official agency has conducted a follow-up study on individual Salvadorans returned by the United States. Private, non-governmental groups cannot, without great difficulty, undertake such an assessment on their own, without the cooperation of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service and the United States Embassy.

This lack of documentation has resulted in broad support for a field study to determine, to the extent possible given conditions in El Salvador, the fate of these Salvadorans who are deported or who are returning voluntarily after being apprehended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. This study should be sponsored by the United States.

Such a study could be done on a random sample basis over a period of several months, and implemented by the U.S. Embassy or a voluntary agency with the cooperation of the U.S. Embassy. The ICRC, the Salvadoran government's Commission on Human Rights, and the Tutela Legal, the human rights monitoring office associated with the Archdiocese of El Salvador, appear willing to accept this important role. Our government should pursue this issue without delay.

Until the results of this study are available, the INS should develop guidelines, such as are used in other areas of the world, which would identify certain categories of Salvadorans who are more likely subject to political violence. There is evidence that teachers and medical personnel face additional risk.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

El Salvador

1. Priorities of humanitarian assistance.—In addition to the continued provision of basic food and medical supplies to displaced persons, our assistance program should now give higher priority to: (1. up-grading conditions in the camps (overcrowding, drainage, etc.); (2. the expansion of employment generation programs and targeting them to benefit the health and welfare of the displaced persons as well as the local community; and (3. the establishment of handicraft and other training programs for women who are idle in the camps.

2. Resolving the plight of displaced persons in church compounds.—Some 4,000 displaced persons—almost wholly women and children—are crowded into the small compounds of the Basilica and churches of the Archdiocese of El Salvador. Some have been there for as long as two to three years—some have even been born there—under conditions that severely limit their freedom. These families have sought the protection of the church because they fear that they will not be assisted or protected under the government's displaced person program. In the eyes of some Salvadoran military and government officials many of these people are seen as "subversives." Even if they are the dependent families of guerrillas or political opponents, they must receive adequate humanitarian assistance.

Every effort should be made to secure the safe removal of these people—to have them

settled elsewhere in El Salvador under the care and protection of a responsible international agency, such as the ICRC or UNHCR. The U.S. Embassy should lend our strong diplomatic support to the resolution of this humanitarian issue, which remains a burden to the church and an unnecessary confinement of the persons involved. It should be in the interests of all concerned—the government, the church, and outside humanitarian organizations—to resolve this problem as soon as possible.

3. Support for human rights organizations.—We should actively support the work of the two principal human rights organizations in El Salvador, the Tutela Legal, which is associated with the Archdiocese, and the newly established Commission on Human Rights. The Tutela Legal has an established record. However, the new Commission on Human Rights, operating out of the President's office, does not yet have a permanent mandate. We should support efforts to codify the work of this Commission in the new Constitution and to assure its future operation and independence.

4. Diplomatic support for the International Committee of the Red Cross.—Two years ago the obstruction that the ICRC faced in obtaining access to prisoners was so great it nearly decided to close its offices and end the pretense that it was able to fulfill its obligations under the Geneva Conventions. However, diplomatic intervention avoided that unfortunate development.

The ICRC now reports improvement in their ability to provide humanitarian assistance to displace persons in El Salvador. It also has access to political and military prisoners held by the Salvadoran authorities. However, it continues to face obstacles in obtaining responses from the government upon many of its recommendations.

The ICRC still needs strong diplomatic support to overcome the persistent resistance it encounters at many levels in El Salvador concerning its work with political and military prisoners and its assistance to civilians in contested zones. Currently in Morazan province the local commander is blocking the transportation of food and medicines to the northern portions of the province, declaring that the intensity of the conflict is too great. If this intervention is of only a short duration, during military operations, ICRC representatives can understand. However, if it extends much longer, it will interfere with ICRC's distribution of relief supplies to non-combatants.

5. Amnesty program.—For a period of three months this summer, El Salvador launched an amnesty program under which some 1,000 came forward—half of whom were political prisoners released from prisons. The program was hindered, however, by its short duration and the lack of any international participation to guarantee protection. We should encourage further amnesty programs under ICRC auspices, and we should join others in the international community in offering third country safe-haven or resettlement opportunities for those seeking it. For example, of the 500 political prisoners released, 200 felt endangered being out of prison without international protection and they sought third country resettlement. Canada, Belgium and Australia agreed to give many safe-haven. The United States should participate in resettling those remaining as we have participated in the past in international efforts to resettle political prisoners.

6. Judiciary reform.—There is a serious need for judiciary reform in El Salvador, and we should continue to support current programs to strengthen their criminal laws and judicial system—all of which affect ef-

² From October, 1982, to March, 1983, approximately 2,000 Salvadorans were returned.

forts to correct human rights abuses. Under El Salvador's laws, particularly the rules of evidence, it is sometimes difficult to prosecute offenders—especially if the charges have political overtones. In addition, many judges are not respected or adequately protected; not surprisingly, when difficult, controversial or dangerous cases come up, many find easier ways out. A serious effort to achieve judicial reform is now underway and it deserves strong support.

Honduras

1. *Support of the refugee program.*—As noted earlier, refugee conditions in Honduras have stabilized and an effective international program of assistance and protection has been established under UNHCR auspices. The United States must be prepared to continue our support of this program until durable solutions are achieved for the refugees. And given the relative hospitality of the Government of Honduras towards refugees and its readiness to absorb refugees on a first asylum basis, the international community needs to offer its continued assurance of diplomatic and financial support.

In the case of the Salvadorans, a durable solution appears distant. The current situation of displaced persons inside El Salvador will not persuade Salvadorans living in far better camps and conditions outside their country to soon return. A more secure countryside, relatively free of conflict, appears to be a precondition to the return of any significant number of those Salvadorans who fled the violence.

As for the Nicaraguan Miskito Indians, they are well on their way to self-sufficiency and possible integration with the Honduran Miskitos. We should support the current care and maintenance programs of the UNHCR as well as assist in mobilizing resources to establish permanent settlements for the Miskitos in Honduras—if they choose to remain. The U.S. Mission and A.I.D. should become more involved in longer term development planning and support.

A third refugee program now emerging—Ladino refugees from Nicaragua—will likely require particular attention in the days ahead, both in terms of preparations for a potential influx of refugees, and in assuring that relief assistance is used only for humanitarian purposes.

2. *Protection of Salvadoran refugees.*—The United States should continue to express to Honduran authorities our strong support for the UNHCR's efforts to provide protection to Salvadoran refugees. This involves not only support of the UNHCR's presence in the camps, but also at the borders.

Particular attention should be paid to protecting refugees at Colomoncagua; if it is necessary to move this camp for security reasons, better planning and support will be necessary to avoid the problems of the earlier move of Salvadorans from the La Virtud camp to Mesa Grande. Also, if the Salvadoran refugees at Colomoncagua must be relocated from the border, the UNHCR's concerns over freedom of movement should be dealt with.

3. *Support UNHCR seminars for Honduran military.*—We should continue our support of the special seminars that UNHCR has conducted with the Honduran army on the Refugee Convention's guidelines on the treatment of refugees. There is every indication that they have had some positive effect on the ability of UNHCR to protect refugees in Honduras, especially towards arriving Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees—as evidenced in what could have become a dangerous incident at the El Teodoro refugee camp for Guatemalans. When the military arrested 18 camp resi-

dents, the Honduran army attempted to adhere to the UNHCR guidelines and sought the involvement of UNHCR officials.

Guatemala

1. *Survey of needs of displaced persons.*—Although it appears that a significant displaced persons problem is developing inside Guatemala, with all its attendant food, health, and medical problems, no one—neither the Guatemalan government, the U.S. Embassy, nor the voluntary agencies—has a grasp of the dimension of the problem. Estimates of the total number of displaced persons range from 10,000 to one million.

The United States should press for a thorough survey of displaced persons—their needs, their whereabouts and their numbers—to be conducted either by the Embassy, a voluntary agency or the government. And we should be prepared to increase substantially our humanitarian assistance program, and to support the work of the voluntary agencies—with P.L. 480 food, with emergency medical supplies, and other relief commodities. If emergency relief is necessary—and some voluntary agency field reports indicate it will be—the American Ambassador should consider taking the necessary steps to activate immediate relief funds through A.I.D.'s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (which was one of the first sources of funding for the displaced persons' program in El Salvador).

If a serious displaced persons problem does develop, American humanitarian assistance should be channeled through an international or voluntary agency serving as coordinator of the displaced persons program.

2. *Guatemalan refugees in Mexico.*—There are currently an estimated 41,000 Guatemalan refugees in the southern Mexican province of Chiapas—primarily Indians from the Ixil-triangle who have fled military campaigns in the countryside in 1981-82. Although the situation in the field has stabilized, conditions remain precarious in some areas with only a two-week food supply and serious health problems. In jungle terrain, logistics also continue to be a problem.

Despite a recent commitment by the Mexican government to offer extended assistance and protection to the refugees, and permission for the UNHCR to establish a permanent presence in the field, a longer-term solution is far off. Few, if any, refugees have been willing to accept the Guatemalan government's offer of amnesty and return to their country. There is a general lack of confidence in the protection they will receive when they return. A carefully negotiated repatriation program under UNHCR auspices, with strong diplomatic and financial support of the United States, might help resolve the problem. A good beginning will be an invitation to refugee leaders to return home—again, under UNHCR protection—to see conditions for themselves.

But it is unlikely they will be persuaded to return if they see displaced persons among their fellow countrymen receiving less assistance or protection than is being received under UNHCR programs in Mexico.

PRESS CONFERENCE SPONSORED BY THE DISABILITY RIGHTS EDUCATION AND DEFENSE FUND

• Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, yesterday, I had the pleasure of participating in a press conference with the world-famous violinist, Itzhak Perlman, to kick off the disability public awareness Foundation project, which will be administered by the disability

rights education and defense fund. The purpose of this project is to increase public awareness of the grass-roots disability rights and independent living movement and the related organizations created by disabled people who work within the movement. In addition, the project is intended to develop initial financial support for a foundation that will continue public awareness activities and provide support to various organizations run by and for disabled people, which have as their goals promoting leadership development, self-determination, and the integration of disabled people into the social, educational, and economic mainstream.

This public awareness project includes a benefit concert to be held at the Kennedy Center on October 1, 1984, featuring Mr. Perlman. In addition, there will be a 1-hour PBS Special concerning disabled people, which will be hosted by Mr. Perlman.

Unfortunately the true purpose of the press conference Monday was overshadowed by the intense media interest in the ongoing saga of Interior Secretary James Watt. As a result, Mr. Perlman and I were questioned almost exclusively on Secretary Watt's recent comments, and his potential fate as a Cabinet member. Therefore, it is important that we not lose sight of the goals of our announced campaign. This project is a matter of great significance to the very real interests of 36 million disabled Americans.

We must continue to do all that is possible to raise public awareness about the handicapped and to promote the noble goals of the disability rights education and defense fund. I urge my colleagues to join in this effort.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, is there further business to come before the Senate?

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished deputy leader for his characteristic courtesy.

I have nothing on this side.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, there is an order for the convening time at 9:30 a.m. in the morning, is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. STEVENS. I thank the Chair.

RECESS UNTIL 9:30 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the order previously entered, that the Senate stand in recess until 9:30 a.m. tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and at 5:55 p.m., the Senate recessed until tomorrow, Wednesday, September 28, 1983, at 9:30 a.m.